



Income Incentives to Labour Participation and Home Production
The Contribution of the Tax Credits in the Netherlands
Mauro Mastrogiacomo and Nicole Voskuilen-Bosch
The responsibility for the contents of this CPB Discussion Paper remains with the author(s)CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Van Stolkweg 14
P.O. Box 80510
2508 GM The Hague, the Netherlands
Telephone +31 70 338 33 80
Telefax +31 70 338 33 50
Internet www.cpb.nl
ISBN 90-5833-264-0Abstract in English
We set up a reduced form model of labour-market participation for young women who have to
balance their career with motherhood. The model accounts for the occurrence of future uncertain
events, like child birth and early retirement, and includes time spent in home production;
however it does not require the estimation of a dynamic programming model. We claim that the
careful implementation of institutions can return optimal life patterns of participation without
the need of a structural approach. The weaker theoretical framework is more than compensated
by the rich spectrum in policy simulations that may be performed. As illustrations, we simulate
the effect of two policy options regarding tax credits on the hazard rate out of work.
Abstract in Dutch
In dit onderzoek presenteren we een herleide-vorm-model voor de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van
jonge vrouwen. Het model houdt rekening met een aantal onzekere factoren die de toekomstige
participatie kunnen verstoren, zoals de geboorte van een kind of vervroegde pensionering.
Nieuw is dat het model ook tijd besteed aan thuiswerk (eng: home production) meeneemt.
We claimen dat ons model geen schatting van een (dynamisch) structureel model vereist. De
zorgvuldige toepassing van de instituties geeft al voldoende informatie om optimale
participatiebeslissingen over de levensloop te kunnen modelleren.
De zwakkere theoretische modellering wordt ruimschoots gecompenseerd door het brede scala
aan beleidssimulaties die uitgevoerd kunnen worden. Ter illustratie simuleren we het effect van
twee beleidsopties; afschafﬁng en verhoging van de arbeidskorting en de combinatiekorting.
Afschafﬁng hiervan verkleint het verschil in levensloopinkomen tussen werken en niet-werken
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56Summary
This study presents a reduced form model of labour-market participation for women who need to
balance their career with motherhood. The model accounts for uncertain future events, like child
birth and early retirement, and also includes home production. However, the model does not
need a dynamic programming framework to be estimated, as careful implementation of the
institutional setting is able to provide information on optimal patterns of labour participation
over the life-cycle. This is an advantage, as it provides a more accessible computational
framework. We refer to the Dutch institutions, as we dispose of data concerning the Netherlands,
that are particularly convenient to this study. The lack of a structural approach, which is a
disadvantage, is more than compensated by the rich spectrum in policy simulations that may be
performed. These can reach from retirement to income policy, include home production or
fertility dynamics. As illustration, we simulate therefore the effect of two policy options
regarding tax credits, and therefore lifetime income proﬁles, on the hazard rate out of work. We
measure the effect of changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Tax Credit to
Employed Parents (TCEP) on the labour-market participation of young cohabiting Dutch
women. These tax reductions (known as “arbeidskorting” and "combinatiekorting" in the
Netherlands) are respectively an incentive to work to participating individuals and participating
individuals with children. The changes in these credits have consequences for the residual
life-cycle income and consumption proﬁles of women, that in turn may affect labour-market
participation decisions.
In the Netherlands, women are in general arranging their life time patterns of labour
participation depending on the timing of arrival of children. In order to gain these insights, we
have to combine different data sets, since no panel exists containing information on time use,
retirement arrangements and work history, which are necessary to this analysis.
This very special labour-market behaviour of Dutch women allows us to estimate a dynamic
hazard model that incorporates probabilistically the uncertainty due to potential future child
birth at young ages, re-entrance into the labour market and the event of early retirement at later
ages. We extend the standard model up to including the value of home production in the
deﬁnition of life-cycle income. This speciﬁcation returns plausible results and indicates that our
hazard model can be employed for relevant policy simulations.
Since the model postulates that income incentives play a role in determining participation, it
is suitable for the above quoted simulation. These tax facilities amount on average to
approximately 4-5% of a two earners household income. The reduction to zero of the EITC
increases female hazard rate out of work by 4% points, from about 12% to about 16%. The effect
of the elimination of the TCEP is lower, about 0.7%. Doubling the value of both the tax credits
decreases the hazard rate by about 3% points. This ﬁnding is robust to different values of the
individual discount rate below 30%. The lower reaction to income increases relative to income
7decreases of the same magnitude may indicate a relative preference for the state out of work as
income rises. However it holds only for the model with home production. The standard model
with market consumption returns no signiﬁcant effect of the income incentive on the hazard. An
interesting future extension of this research should include directly savings and consumption in
the model. Dutch panel data sets are not yet a promising base to such developments.
81 Introduction
In the Netherlands, women arrange their life-time patterns of labour participation depending on
the timing of arrival of children (Bloemen and Kalwij (2001)). Before the birth of the ﬁrst child
women have labour participation levels and wages that are comparable to the ones of their
cohabiting counterparts (Kalwij (2003)). Upon the arrival of children most women stop working.
Those who continue, do so by reducing their labour supply by about 40%. When children enter
the household women begin to spend more time home-producing goods, and this arrangement is
only relaxed when children grow older. In the data available, only the cross-sectional evidence
testiﬁes of this partial return to the labour market. The panel, shows no evidence of substantial
re-entrances as it does no track women long enough over time to observe their return to the
labour market1.
This paper is largely inspired by the home production literature concerned with household
life-cycle consumption and savings (Apps and Rees (2000)). Despite the promising results of
initial studies (Apps and Rees (2001), Apps (2003) and Apps and Rees (2003)), recently others
have found this explanation insufﬁcient to account, for instance, for the well known puzzle of the
drop in consumption upon retirement (Banks et al. (1998)). Haider and StephensJr (2004) ﬁnd
that after retirement there is a drop in consumption both for home produced food and market
purchased food in the United States. Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) report that the amount of time
spent by women in home production activities hardly changes before and after retirement.
Despite these criticisms, we believe that “home production” is worth exploring2. We will use a
dynamic model that takes into account the endogeneity between fertility and work decisions in a
simple way. Solution of this problem would otherwise require a structural model (see
Francesconi (2002)). There is however a drawback to our approach, since time use data,
necessary to include home production in the model, are not present in our main data source. We
will impute them out of our sample3.
1 This is noted also by Kalwij (2003). In our model, we will show that this may be due to panel attrition. The possible
explanation is that since participation in the panel is conditional on residence, upon child birth all those who move to a
new house may “get lost” for data collectors, therefore leaving a selected group of households in the panel. This means
that if the birth of a child implies need for new housing and stopping work at the same time, the drop out of the panel (and
consequent unobservable re-entrance) may be selective.
2 Several studies have found that the presence of children is a strong determinant of (income and) consumption proﬁles
over the life-cycle. These ﬁndings own to the so called “demographic” explanation of the standard model (e.g.: Attanasio
and Browning (1995), Browning and Ejrnaes (2002)). Also for the Netherlands it is found that the timing of arrival of
children strongly affects income, consumption and saving behaviour of households (Kalwij (2003)). This evidently calls for
models that explicitly take this into account. The present study will not go back to the puzzling results from the
consumption-saving literature. We want to introduce the timing of birth and the consequent value of home production in
our life-time consumption measures.
3 Computations are based on an out of sample imputation, since we assume that all the observed characteristics included
in the imputation model are strictly exogenous. More sophisticated methods, like instrumental variables, split sample
techniques, are proposed (see Angrist and Krueger (1994)) and may well be applied to our problem in case, we want to
enlarge the set of characteristics included.
9In order keep the model empirically tractable, we treat as exogenous three relevant stochastic
events that may affect labour participation and earnings of women. These events are the arrival
of a child, women’s re-entrance into the labour market and eligibility to early retirement at a
given age. This means that we are going to present a ‘probabilistic model’ in which we compute
the expected full income4 proﬁles associated to the two states we consider: employment and
non-employment. Exogenous determination of arrival of children is also used in Apps and Rees
(2003) while for early retirement in the Netherlands see Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004).
This paper contributes to the literature in different regards. First, we explicitly include the
perspective of future child birth in the determination of the expected labour supply of women
and therefore on income patterns of a household (rather than on income patterns directly).
Second, we disclose the relevance of home production for women in the Netherlands, an area
that to our knowledge is hardly ever explored. Third, we illustrate the evaluation of the tax
credits policy in a life-time context and compare the results of this evaluation when we include
home production in the model or not. Finally, we enquiry the relevance of attrition bias in
looking at young households, who are more likely to leave their houses, and therefore the panel,
upon child birth, when they are also more likely to (temporarily) leave the labour market.
The rest of this study is organised as follows. The data sets used are described in the second
Section. In the third we present the model. In the fourth, we show some results and simulate two
policy options. Five appendixes are added, those extend on the tax credits, the imputation of the
probability distribution of a birth event and early retirement, re-entrances into the labour market
after child birth, our income incentive measure to participation and home production.
4 Full income is the sum of the value of hours supplied on the market (wage) plus the value of hours reserved for home
production. We impute this second value on the base of the time spent in home production paid at the hourly wage of
home assistants. We therefore follow the so called ’input approach’ to the evaluation of home production (see for instance
Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003)).
102 Data
As anticipated above no panel data set exists for the Netherlands that includes information on a
large and representative sample of the Dutch population, where time use data, retirement
arrangements and a large set of background characteristics are available at the same time.
Therefore we combine several sources.
We use the Social Economic Panel (SEP) administered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) to
extract the representative sample and the relevant background characteristics, including earnings.
From the CERRA data 1993 (Centre for Economic Research on Retirement and Aging),
administered by Leiden University, we extract information concerning individual retirement
arrangements. Finally the Time Use Survey 1995 and 2000 (TBO- Tijdbestedingonderzoek) is
used to derive information on time employed in housework. This last data set is a repeated
cross-section administered by the Social and Cultural Planning Ofﬁce (SCP), without a
longitudinal dimension. It takes place every 5 years. All 3 data sets use a sampling procedure
based on area code and interview a representative sub sample of the Dutch population.
2.1 SEP and the arrival of children
In order to organise the data, we loosely follow Apps and Rees (2001). We divide the life-time
of the household in different phases. In the ﬁrst the adult household members live together, are
of working age, fertility age (woman < 45), and have no children. In the second the household
has children of pre school age (0-3). Women’s labour participation in phases 1 and 2, and their
hazard rate out of work, is the object of the present study. In the third the household has children
of school age (4-18). In the fourth the children are older than 18 and at least one spouse is of
working age (therefore younger than 65), or the household has no children and the woman is 45
plus. Women in phases 3 and 4 are included in the sample in order to impute the probability
distribution of age of delivery of a baby. In the last phase both adults are retired (65 plus). This
last group is selected out of the CERRA data, in order to impute the probability distribution of
early retirement age. We select from the SEP a panel with 15 waves in the period 1987-2000.
Table 2.1 shows the stages of the sample selection. Most observations are lost because of the age
selection and because we exclude the self employed. Since we study yearly labour-market
transitions it is important to have a panel that is continuous over time. We are left with
approximately 14,000 observations. These individuals are interviewed from 2 to 14 times. About
7,000 observations are in the ﬁrst two phases of the household life-cycle, that constitute our
main sample. We select women employed in t −1 and looked at their employment status in t.
We have also discarded all those who, non employed in t −1, return to work in t (absorbing state
assumption), as these appear to be a very small and selected group. This means that we only
model transitions out of work and renounce to model re-entrances in the labour market. Though
11this may seem a very selective approach for young women, inspection of the data suggests that
we cannot do otherwise. This is evident from the selection procedure reported in table 2.1 and in
the panel as reported in Table 2.2, where women are followed over time and on average not
directly observed returning to work (though in the table we only show the net effect of drops and
re-entrances). We do not give up considering re-entrances completely and bring this option in
our measure of the expected income proﬁles of those out of work (see section 3.3.3). When out
of work, women are assumed to have a probability of re-entrance in the labour market that
increases with the age of their children and diminishes as women approach the old age (we
extract this information looking at women’s participation with older children, not withstanding
whether the birth event or their re-entrance is observed or not). This means that even though we
exclude the possibility of a re-entrance (we model therefore only the hazard rate out of work,
consistently with the absorbing state assumption) we allow women to include this possibility
into their expected income proﬁle (which in our analysis is an explanatory variable) conditional
on the age of their children.
Table 2.1 Sample selection
Unbalanced panel period 1987-2000 51442
Reason for removal Observations dropped Share
%
Age selection (18-64) 7812 15
Panel inconsistencies 2031 4
Self employed 4553 9
Non realistic wage rate 6204 12
Absorbing state assumption violations 2126 4
Housewives 11934 23
Not informative for model estimation 2225 4
Total 14557
In phase 1 5248 36
In phase 2 2194 15
In phase 3 4061 28
In phase 4 3054 21
Explanatory note: Panel inconsistencies refer to non time-consistent aging of children or spouses. We exclude the self-employed
because we cannot rely on wage proﬁles to impute their future earnings. Wage rates below the minimum wage and above 200 guilders
per hour are considered non realistic. “Housewives” are those who have no records of labour-market participation ever. Non informative
are all observations of non employed women that follow the ﬁrst observed transition out of work.
Source: SEP, own computations.
The gain of this approach, which at ﬁrst sight may appear peculiar, is that we don’t need to
bother about modelling transitions from non employment to employment in the main model.
12Table 2.2 Household situation around the time of ﬁrst birth for women
Years Time spent Hours of Partici- Yearly Hourly Age Obs
from/since in home employment pation wage wage
birth production rate
%
− 11 14 38 100 29025 15 23 6
− 10 15 35 100 30612 17 24 10
− 9 15 34 100 30413 17 24 14
− 8 15 35 96 31597 17 25 24
− 7 15 36 100 32932 18 25 40
− 6 15 35 94 30858 18 25 81
− 5 15 35 92 32865 20 25 137
− 4 16 35 92 32280 19 26 221
− 3 16 35 91 32759 19 27 300
− 2 17 34 87 32865 20 27 409
− 1 18 33 79 30444 21 28 532
0 40 26 41 22707 24 29 532
1 40 22 33 18938 24 30 443
2 39 22 27 19254 25 31 364
3 39 22 28 20553 26 32 296
4 32 21 27 19575 28 33 220
5 32 22 23 20388 27 34 168
6 33 21 23 21422 29 35 133
7 33 20 23 18143 29 36 91
8 33 20 17 17390 28 37 70
9 20 24 16561 27 38 49
10 21 24 19775 26 39 29
11 23 25 26441 34 39 16
12 26 30 38511 43 40 10
Explanatory note: Only a few households are followed long after giving birth. The dimension of the sample is therefore extremely small
already 5 years after and before the birth of the ﬁrst child, which makes these ﬁgures only indicative. Time spent in home production is
imputed out of the TBO data.
Source: SEP and TBO, own computations.
This would be based on very few observations and therefore unreliable. But we also avoid
assuming no perspective of re-entrance in the computation of the future income proﬁles, which
we may justify only because of a deﬁciency of the data, and is not in line with anecdotic
evidence concerning the Netherlands (Vlasblom and Schippers (2005)). 5.
Following Kalwij (2004), we also look at those households participating in the panel observed
before and after child birth. In tables 2.2 and 2.3, we see that after child birth labour
participation of women drops and stays low for a very long period. Those who keep on working
5 Details about the imputation of re-entrance probabilities are in Appendix C.
13Table 2.3 Household situation around the time of ﬁrst birth for men
Years Hours of Partici- Yearly Hourly Age Obs
from/since employment pation wage wage
birth rate
%
− 11 39 100 35918 18 26 6
− 10 39 100 36818 18 27 10
− 9 39 100 40377 20 27 14
− 8 39 96 37772 19 28 24
− 7 38 95 38519 20 28 40
− 6 37 93 38712 20 27 81
− 5 38 93 41417 21 28 137
− 4 38 90 41983 21 28 221
− 3 38 92 43062 22 29 300
− 2 37 89 44815 23 30 409
− 1 37 89 46486 24 30 532
0 36 90 49214 26 31 532
1 37 91 51758 27 32 443
2 38 92 56005 29 33 364
3 37 90 57532 30 34 296
4 38 93 59069 30 35 220
5 39 93 60824 30 36 168
6 39 92 65164 33 38 133
7 40 97 66411 32 38 91
8 40 97 70136 33 39 70
9 40 96 73370 36 40 49
10 39 90 71671 35 41 29
11 42 100 65614 31 40 16
12 40 90 69528 31 41 10
Explanatory note: Only a few households are followed long after giving birth. The dimension of the sample is therefore extremely small
already 5 years after and before the birth of the ﬁrst child, which makes these ﬁgures only indicative.
Source: SEP, own computations.
diminish substantially their labour supply. The wage rate for those employed keeps on rising.
This is also the case for men. Men however do not modify their participation and their labour
supply and immediately after birth are still, on average, in full time employment. This shows the
need to explicitly bring into our hazard model the timing of arrival of children. We do so by
employing information about all women in the SEP, since those with children report the age at
which birth events occurred. This allows us to estimate the probability distribution of a birth
event according to the age of the mother (see Appendix B).
142.2 TBO and CERRA
As mentioned in the introduction, women’s drop in participation when giving birth may be more
properly viewed as a substitution between hours supplied on the market and hours spent on
home production. Information concerning time use is present in the TBO data. We extract data
on hours spent in home production from the joint cross-sections 1995 and 2000, and impute it in
our sample of women in phases 1 and 2 of the SEP. Details on this procedure can be found in
Appendix E. In ﬁgure 2.1, we do not report results on the basis of our main sample, but of a
different sample that only includes women who are observed shifting from phase 1 to phase 2,
therefore giving birth to a child. This group is smaller, and therefore selective, but shows some
interesting implications that may have general descriptive validity. The ﬁgure reports on the
horizontal axis the time to and since the birth of the ﬁrst child (some points are missing because
of problems of sample size). On the vertical axis, we set the amount of hours per week. In this
ﬁgure, we also make a distinction between employment and non employment in order to gain
insights of how women allocate their time over the household life-cycle. We observe that the
labour supply for those who keep on working drops by about 40% after the birth of the ﬁrst child.
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When the ﬁrst child is about 10, women increase again their labour supply (however we only
have about 50 observations for ages larger or equal to 10 which may be unreliable). This
tendency is not even strong, as also the average ﬁgures in table 2.2 suggest. The amount of
weekly hours spent on home production, differs substantially according to whether a woman is
15employed or not. This difference between employed and non employed women, however,
diminishes after the birth of the ﬁrst child, when time in home production sharply increases both
for those women who remain employed and for those non employed. The amount of time spent
in home production is allowed to depend on the age category of the child, and therefore
diminishes after the child is 9. This different impact of the (value of) time spent in home
production according to whether a ﬁrst child is present in the household or not, and according to
whether his mum is employed or not, will be used to construct the future (full) income proﬁles.
From the last data set introduced above, CERRA, we only extract data concerning the pension
replacement rate and the age of eligibility to the early retirement schemes. We refer to other
work for a comprehensive description of the main trends for these variables (Heyma (2001)).
Here (see ﬁgure B.1 in Appendix B) we only show the frequencies associated to the age of
eligibility to early retirement and the probabilities that we impute in the SEP with a procedure
that is similar to the one used for child birth in ﬁgure B.2, also in the same Appendix.
The last main element affecting the future income proﬁles of women is the probability to
re-enter the labour market when non-employed. As evident from table 2.2 the panel shows no
general increase in labour participation. Looking into the panel, we notice that this is due to the
fact that few cases of re-entrances are observed.
In Appendix C, we show that the unbalanced panel can give some indication of re-entrance
patterns, that may suggest that women consider the option of re-entrance in forming future
income expectations. These effects are small, consistent with our choice to model only exits
from the labour market.
163 Model and implementation
3.1 Theoretical model
In order to model the hazard rate out of work, we refer to a standard dynamic utility model. We
assume that the observed decision to join the labour force or not is optimal and motivated by the
comparison of consumption/income streams associated to employment and non-employment.
This means that if we observe employment as a choice variable, the individual has compared the
lifetime utility derived from continued work, versus the one derived from withdrawal; and that









where c stands for (market or full) consumption and y for labour-market participation of women.
We maintain a no savings assumption and therefore in our model the budget constraint is
implicit6.
If we select those women employed in t −1, this problem is similar to the solution of a





with δ as an individual discount factor. This generates two possible value functions, one for
employment (yi,t = 1) and the other one for non-employment (yi,t = 0):
V
yi,t=1
i,t = ui,t(1)+δEt maxyi,t[Vi,t+1(1)]
V
yi,t=0
i,t = ui,t(0)+δEt maxyi,t[Vi,t+1(0)]





Vi = E(ui(ci;yi)) (3.4)
Evidently in order to easily implement this model empirically, we need to make some
assumptions on the determination of Vi,t+1(·). For the case of non-employment the values
associated toVi,t+1(0) will be based on the combination of the value of future income in case of
(probabilistic) re-entrance and the unemployment beneﬁt. In the same fashion we will also
simplify the determination of Vi,t+1(1) (using a wage equation) without having to face the
6 Kalwij (2004) has shown signiﬁcant presence of excess sensitivity of consumption to income in the Netherlands, which
makes our substitution of consumption with income less of a severe problem as it may seem.
17complexity of its dynamic programming solution. Previous research that has looked at the
implicit taxation in the Dutch early retirement schemes (Lindeboom (1999)), at the plans of
Dutch employees (Heyma (2001)) and the generosity of the Dutch early retirement schemes
(Lindeboom (1998), Kerkhofs et al. (1999)) shows that individuals, in great majority, tend to
work up to the moment in which they will become eligible to early retirement and then retire.
Mastrogiacomo (2004) has estimated a reduced form model in which retirement age is integrated
out of the dynamic maximisation problem. We follow this approach and use this evidence as a
behavioural assumption. We employ the probability distribution of eligibility age to compute the
expected maximum value ofVi,t+1(1). A further complication that we bring in the computation
of the income/consumption proﬁle for those who continue working (Vi,t+1(1)) is that upon the
(probabilistic) arrival of a child (ﬁrst or second child) women will participate less into the labour
market7. At each future moment in time this will depend on the age (probabilistic again) of the
child. At birth the drop will be of about 40% that reduces to 20% when the child is above 12.
We opt for the following speciﬁcation of the utility function 3.1, that is additive and
separable:
ui
t(ci,t;yi,t) = ν(ci,t)+ν(yi,t) (3.5)
where ν(·) takes a logarithmic form and home production enters the model by augmenting
consumption. We introduce home production in the following way:
ν(ci,t) = ν(ci,t +Pi,t) (3.6)
that brings “full consumption” in the model as the sum of the values of market consumption and
home production (Pi,t).
Before continuing to the empirical implementation, we will summarise again the main
assumptions:
1. Utility is additive and separable
2. No savings: households consume all their household income.
3. The expected income of those who stop working takes re-entrance probabilities into account.
4. Those who choose to continue working will work less when a child is born, depending on how
old the child is, and will stop at the age of eligibility to early retirement.
This last assumption allows us to solve the model in reduced form, and is supported by the
precise implementation of the Dutch retirement institutions.
7 How much less is established on the basis of the computations in ﬁgure 2.1. This means that we assume a strict
proportionality between hours worked in t −1 and t if in t child birth is expected. This is a very strong assumption since it
assumes a (stochastic) drop in participation that is actually what the model may aim to explain. As will be clear later, we
will introduce the presence of children in the initial condition equation that will be therefore the exclusion restriction
explaining observed participation at the ﬁrst observation in time. The proportional drop in participation plays a role
exclusively in determining the expected pattern of future income and participation, of course not the observed choices
(that are indeed the revealed preferences in the model).
183.2 Empirical implementation
Equation 3.5 is very general and in this section, we will try to ﬁnd a tractable empirical version.
Due to the fact that, we only select those employed in t −1 and observe their choice in t
(therefore excluding shifts from non-employment to employment), we cannot freely specify this
function. To illustrate this, we can also state this data selection in mathematical terms. Let
yi,t = 1 if the respondent i works in period t, and yi,t = 0 if she is out of the labour force. The
selection implies that
yi,t = 1 ⇒ yi,t−1 = yi,t−2 = ... = yi,1 = 1 (3.7)
Pr(yi,τ = 0 | yi,t = 0) = 1, if τ >t (3.8)
If we apply this selection on the data, we have to give up all these observations in which she is
observed returning into the labour market. Suppose we have a panel of t = 4 waves. We observe
a woman working in the last period only if she is working also in the previous period. First we
rewrite the simultaneous probability Pr(yi,4 = 1,yi,3 = 1,yi,2 = 1,yi,1 = 1) as a product of
conditional probabilities, e.g.:
Pr(yi,4 = 0,yi,3 = 1,yi,2 = 1,yi,1 = 1) =
Pr(yi,4 = 0 | yi,3 = 1,yi,2 = 1,yi,1 = 1)∗...
Pr(yi,3 = 1 | yi,2 = 1,yi,1 = 1)∗Pr(yi,2 = 1 | yi,1 = 1)∗Pr(yi,1 = 1)
Then, we model these conditional probabilities:
Pr(yi,t = k | yi,t−1 = 1,yi,t−2 = 1,...,yi,1 = 1) =
Pr(yi,t = k | yi,t−1 = 1)
and the ‘initial (selection) condition’: Pr(yi,1 = 1) (see end of the paragraph).
The choice of what function to estimate is strongly depending on this condition. We would
like for instance to estimate the impact of habit formation (how dependent are current choices on
past choices) in our model. However as the following example shows, there are some
complications. Write:
ut(ci,t,yi,t;yi,t−1) = α01yi,t−1yi,t +α1ci,t +α02yi,t. (3.9)
We are faced with the following:
Lemma 1. Due to the fact that transitions from non-work to work are discarded, we cannot
identify the impact of habit formation.
Proof 1. As: yi,t = 1 ⇒ yi,t−1 = 1 ⇒ yi,t−1yi,t = 1. Moreover, yi,t = 0 ⇒ yi,t−1yi,t = 0.
In other words, the variables yi,t and yi,t−1yi,t are observationally equivalent . Therefore, utility
19function (3.9) can be rewritten as follows:
ut(ci,t,yi,t;yi,t−1) = α1ci,t +(α01+α02)yi,t (3.10)
Therefore the ’habit formation’ utility (3.9) is observationally equivalent to utility function with
no lag8.
This is important to point out in order to interpret the results correctly. We decided to rewrite the
above equation as follows:
ut(ci,t,yi,t) = α1ci,t +α2yi,t +α3(ci,t ∗yi,t) (3.12)
where (α01+α02) = α2 and where we also added the interaction (product) between consumption
and participation in order to account for possible non separabilities in the utility derived from
consumption between participating and non participating women. Other taste shifters will also
be added to this speciﬁcation.
Disposing of a panel, we can add a next step. We observe women revealing their preferences
in t between yi,t = 1 and yi,t = 0. This means that for these individuals working in t and in t −1,
we can rewrite 3.3 as :
ut(yi,t−1 = 1,yi,t = 1) > ut(yi,t−1 = 1,yi,t = 0) (3.13)
as we assume this decision to be the result of an optimisation process. The difference in these
utility levels is what motivates the labour-market choice. Before operationally specifying these
functions let us concentrate on the identiﬁcation of the parameters included and the likelihood.
Like Blau (1998) we (have to) allow for state dependence (i.e. the parameters of the utility
function depend on labour participation choices). In this way, we link the theoretical model
sketched above with our implementation. We attach two subscripts j and k to the value function
appearing in equation 3.4: Vjk (τ). Subscript yi,τ = k denotes current-period labour force status
(k = 0,1) and j the previous period status9. We could rewrite the decision problem in a dynamic
programming format. We do not solve the dynamic programming problem as part of the
estimation, as the Dutch institutions already suggest a pattern of optimality. Instead, we follow
the methodology of Blau (1998) and approximate the value functionVjk,τ as follows:
Vjk(τ) = Z0
kταj +X0
τβjk +γjkµ +εkτ (3.14)
8 We can also change the speciﬁcation of the intratemporal utility function a bit, e.g. in the following way:
uh
t (ci,t,yi,t;yi,t−1) = α01yi,t−1 +α1ci,t +α2yi,t (3.11)
Obviously, the variables yi,t and yi,t−1 should not be perfectly collinear. If we write down the function corresponding to
within period preferences (3.11), we can show that one identiﬁes separately the impact of habit formation if transitions
from non-work to work are allowed. In his model Blau (1998) allows for habit formation. He is able to do that because in
the United States a retired person regularly returns to the labour market, while in our panel re-entrances are negligible.
9 Notice that since we assume retirement as an absorbing state (that implies yi,t−1 = 1 ∀ i = 1,...,N, t = 1,...,T ) j is
always equal to 1.
20where the X0s are exogenous variables affecting preferences (taste shifters) and expectations. µ
is an unobserved time-invariant individual speciﬁc random effect. We assume that µ is
independent across individuals and follows a normal distribution with expectation 0 and variance
σ2
µ. εkτ follows an extreme value type I-distribution. We assume that εkτ is uncorrelated over
time and across alternatives and will be treated as εkτ = ηi +ζi,t.
The Z0s are state-speciﬁc ‘incentive’ variables that incorporate the future consumption and
participation proﬁles introduced above. This means that the alphas are identiﬁed because the Z0s
differ between employed and non employed individuals. For the betas, we need an identiﬁcation
assumption (β0 = 0). In equation 3.14, we can also introduce home production. It will be an
element of Z since, as shown in ﬁgure 2.1, home production varies between employed and non
employed.
Suppose that the econometrician knows the value of µ (later on, we will relax this
assumption). Model (3.14) implies the following transition probabilities, λjkτ(µ), from state j to
state k:
λjkτ(µ) = Pr(Vjk(τ)) >Vjm(τ)(j,1)∀m 6= k | µ,yi,τ−1 = j) (3.15)
This expression boils down to a random effect logit model when ε is taken as an EV type I
distribution. By conditioning the estimation on yi,1 = j = 1, we are implicitly assuming that this
selection does not bias our results. To correct this, we add an ‘initial condition equation’ to the
model. This has (if we suppress the individual index i) the logit form:
V1(l) = X0
1ωl +κlµ +υl,l = 0,1 (3.16)
Il(µ) = Pr(yi,1 = l) = Pr(V1(l) >V1(j)∀j 6= l) (3.17)
and X will include some exclusion restrictions (in particular the presence of children or not).
Notice that the household effect µ appears both in the transition model and the initial
condition equation. This establishes a correlation between the two equations since we assume υi
uncorrelated with ζi,t but correlated to ηi(we assume E(υi|ηi) = ρηi). The likelihood
contribution per household will therefore take into account the probability of being observed into
employment in the ﬁrst period, as well as the probability of remaining employed the next period.





















where dklt = 1 if the couple moves from state k in period t −1 to state l in period t and equal to
0 otherwise. dj1 = 1 if couple is in state j in the initial period 1, and 0 otherwise. Ij(µ) is the
corresponding probability.
Instead of maximising the likelihood, we estimate the model by means of simulated
maximum likelihood (150 draws). In equation 3.2, we have shown that the theoretical model
21also implies an individual discount factor. We have been silent so far about it because the model
does not allow, in this simpliﬁed setting, its identiﬁcation. Though this is a shortcoming of the
model, we can show, with sensitivity analysis, that this is no impediment to estimate the impact
of the tax credits policy on labour participation.
In the remaining of this section, we clarify some of the elements that determineVi,t+1(·) and
that have only been introduced above, namely:
• Speciﬁcation of income/consumption over the life cycle
• Speciﬁcation of participation over the life cycle.
3.3 Future consumption and participation
In order to solve the maximisation problem 3.1, we need consumption and participation over the
whole life of each individual. Since no panel exists that provides such information, we have to
rely on imputations techniques to approximate these random variables for each entry in the data.
Our departure point is that only three stochastic events may perturbate the future life of each
woman. The ﬁrst is the occurrence of motherhood, the second is the re-entrance after
(temporarily) leaving the labour market and the third is early retirement. Furthermore in line
with previous studies we assume that these events are exogenously determined (and can
therefore be integrated out).
Even under such strong simpliﬁcations, notice that we do not observe the exact moment of future
child birth, nor the exact moment of early retirement or re-entrance into the labour market. We
circumvent this problem by employing expected utility theory. In the previous Section we have
introduced the imputation of the probability distribution of such events (more details in
Appendix B).
3.3.1 Consumption/Income
Our ﬁrst step is therefore to determine the complete wage rate proﬁle of each individual in the
sample. We opted for an autoregressive random effect model. The model is extremely simpliﬁed
and takes into account cohort effects, differences in human capital and current wage10. We have
chosen this speciﬁcation because we ﬁnd evidence of systematic cohort differentials in wages
(probably indicating productivity shocks).
The model we use to project future wages (y) is:
yit = α +xitβ +νi +Àit i = 1,...,N; t = 1,...,Ti, (3.19)
where Àit = ϑÀi,t−1+φit and |ϑ| < 1 and φit is iid with zero mean and variance σ2
n while νi are
10 Note that we do not aim to estimate a full wage equation, but just to get a reasonable estimate of in order to impute
future wages (Burkhauser et al. (2004)) .
22Table 3.1 Wage model
Men St. error Women St. error
Estimate Estimate
Wage rate in t-1 0.544 0.006 0.225 0.008
Education 2.978 0.114 2.768 0.148
1967 - 1971 cohort 0.252 0.576 − 0.060 0.503
1962 - 1966 cohort 0.162 0.551 − 0.362 0.510
1957 - 1961 cohort 0.267 0.554 − 0.881 0.537
1952 - 1956 cohort 0.517 0.569 − 1.648 0.569
1947 - 1951 cohort 0.804 0.583 − 1.793 0.617
1942 - 1946 cohort 0.978 0.615 − 3.866 0.688
1937 - 1941 cohort 0.504 0.659 − 1.800 0.857
1932 - 1936 cohort 0.612 0.731 − 3.209 1.241
1927 - 1931 cohort − 0.852 0.978 − 0.938 1.729
1922 - 1926 cohort 3.369 2.850
Experience 0.178 0.034 0.296 0.045
Experience square − 0.002 0.001 − 0.003 0.001
Constant 4.763 0.565 9.553 0.541
Observations 19902 12845
Explanatory note: The cohort with older individuals is excluded.
Source: SEP, own computations.
ﬁxed parameters that can be correlated to xit if those vary over time. The results of this random
effect model (for men) are summarised in table 3.1
3.3.2 Participation
We project current participation and labour supply into the future. This pattern is of course not
deterministic. In the data, we observe for instance that participation of women drops on average
by about 40% when they give birth and stays lower than initial participation until the child is 12
(20% lower). Also the data from the Research on Family Formation 1998 (OG ’98) support the
idea that women do not stop working completely after giving birth to the ﬁrst child and that
withdrawal may only be temporary. In that sample 72% of the women interviewed continued
working. However, we have a stricter deﬁnition of employment (at least 12 hours per week), and
we ﬁnd that only 50% of those employed keep on working more than 12 hours after giving birth
(see table 2.2). At later ages the most signiﬁcant drop in participation takes place after the age of
eligibility to early retirement.
Since we don’t know exactly (nor does the individual) when these two events will occur, it is
reasonable to assume some uncertainty in the model. As mentioned, we use the probability
distribution of these events for the future.
23Further in the model, we will rely on the evidence emerged from the literature that when one is
eligible to early retirement she will stop with work (Heyma (2001), Lindeboom (1999)). Of
course when our younger women will be in phase 3 and 4 early retirement will represent the
only possible perturbation to their labour participation pattern, since they will be too old to give
birth to a child.
Knowing the wage rate and the way individuals expect to take part into the labour market in
the future, on the basis of our behavioural assumptions we can construct the ’expected
consumption’ and ’expected participation’ that should enter the utility function.
3.3.3 Utility levels
According to equation 3.13, we must specify a value for the utility of employment and
non-employment. In this paragraph, we summarise the options available to the woman who
chooses in t whether to stop with work or not, conditional on participation in t −1. These utility
levels determine the value of continued employment versus immediate retirement under the
assumptions sketched above. In the ﬁrst case, we assume that if a woman decides to continue
working, she will receive (and consume because we have a no saving assumption) half of the
family wage (that is the yearly wage earned by her partner and herself) in each future year. Since
we allow her labour supply to vary if she gets children, at that point her yearly wage will drop,
while the yearly wage of the man will not react to the birth event. Her yearly wage will increase
again when the child gets older and ﬁnally will drop at eligibility to early retirement. Therefore
deﬁning p as the indicator for the woman, h as the indicator for the men, τ = year of observation










































































whereC and H represent income/consumption and participation, r is a discount factor, wk
it
(k = h,p) is the yearly (full) income. sk
it are survival probabilities (derived from life expectancy
tables of the CBS), w
p∗
it is the yearly (full) income under the assumption that the amount of
hours worked after child birth will diminish by a factor of proportionality varying with the age of
the child, πit is the probability of a child birth (that takes positive values only between age 20
and age 40), eit is the probability of eligibility to an early retirement beneﬁt (that takes positive
values only between age 55 and 64) and R is the replacement rate11 of the early retirement
11 Notice that Rp does not vary with time since the early retirement schemes, we describe in this paper are non actuarially
fair.
24beneﬁt (R = 1 if T < 55+yob and R < 1 if T ≥ 55+yob ). In the second term h
p
it expresses
participation in the range 0 to 1 where unity corresponds to 38 hours employment per week, that
is customary in the Netherlands.







































where qit is an indicator that takes value 1 if the woman is eligible to unemployment beneﬁt,
WWit is the level of the unemployment beneﬁt12 and m
p
it is a re-entrance probability that is equal
to zero in the current period and takes positive values in the future. The difference between 3.20
and 3.23 is depicted in ﬁgure D.1 in Appendix D. The option of re-entrance enters therefore only
the income proﬁle of those out of work, and is not consider in the hazard model. The absorbing
state assumption is justiﬁed by the few observations available for women who give birth, exit
and re-enter the labour market available in our sample. If we extend the sample to including all
women with older children that are not in the sample at the time of birth we have sufﬁcient
information to adapt the income proﬁles.
Notice that child support programs are supplied independently of the choice to stop with
work or not, and therefore do not affect the difference among the two choices. Maternity leave is
instead accounted for since we do not lower the wage of the mother in the ﬁrst year after birth.
Both utility levels above can also include home production if we add the value of time spent
home working (which we have excluded from the formula in order to simplify the exposition).
12 The duration of the unemployment beneﬁt depends on the amount of years worked before t.
25264 Results
We dispose of about 7000 observations. Since we have a panel, we isolate the ﬁrst entry in time
for each household, and we use it for estimating the selection equation (results available from the
corresponding author), that is the auxiliary equation of this model. The remaining 4100
observations are used to estimate the main equation (equation 3.20). Table 4.1 shows results for
the model with home production. It shows logit coefﬁcients and not marginal effects. These
results are estimated for a value of the individual discount rate r = 0.1.
The table shows that the effect of consumption (on the probability to stay employed), also
derived from the sum of α1+α3, is positive and signiﬁcant (the marginal effect computed at the
sample mean is about 0.04). We will act on this element of the model to implement the two
policy simulations later on. Signiﬁcant is also the α3 alone in models 3 and 4, that indicates
differences in the utility of consumption between participating and non participating women.
The sign of α2 indicates disutility from life-time participation to the labour market. The taste
shifters (in Models 2 and 4) are in general signiﬁcant. Women with intermediate education or
cohabiting with an intermediate educated man, are less likely to continue their participation into
the labour market. The direction of this effect is the opposite in the initial condition equation
(which we don’t show). This indicates that higher educated women of fertility age are more
likely to have a job in the ﬁrst place, but less likely to continue working as time goes by, relative
to elementary educated women. This result was not expected. We have also included a ‘macro’
indicator, namely a dummy that picks value one in years in which the registered unemployment
is relatively high. Surprisingly this takes up a positive value. This may be due to the fact that
these years are also the most recent, and over time women participation has been steadily
increasing. We also added some selectivity indicators to test whether attrition may bias our
results (Verbeek and Nijman (1992)). These are dummy variables that take the value 1 in the last
year in which one participates into the survey. These coefﬁcients have a negative sign in each
year, indicating that those who will exit the survey are also less likely to remain employed. For
values of the discount rate larger than 2, we reject the null hypothesis that these coefﬁcients are
jointly equal to zero (χ2
(11)= 25.84). This indicates that attrition may indeed bias our results. We
can only speculate that family enlargements at younger ages may imply at the same time the
need for a larger house and less women’s labour participation. We also have to be clear about the
fact that testing for selectivity is not the same as correcting for it. Such correction is beyond the
scope of the present study. In the table, we show that ρ and σµ did not turn out signiﬁcant.
The most interesting parameter for this study is evidently the one relative to full
consumption. In order to get an idea of its marginal effect we decided to employ the model for
some simulations that affect the income/consumption proﬁle of each woman.
27Table 4.1 Estimation results main equation for models with full consumption
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
estimate estimate estimate estimate
Consumption (α1) 0.18* 0.21* − 0.08 − 1.13*
Residual life-time participation (α2) − 0.28* − 0.27* − 0.27* − 0.29*
Consumption times participation (α3) 0.25* 1.33*
Taste shifters
Years of tight labour market 2.06* 2.06*
Woman intermediate education − 0.20* − 0.17*
Woman higher education − 0.07 0.09
Men intermediate education − 0.15* − 0.27*
Men higher education − 0.13 − 0.24*
Woman civil servant 0.08 0.10
Selectivity indicators
Exit survey in 1989 − 2.38* − 2.23*
Exit survey in 1990 − 2.74* − 2.63*
Exit survey in 1991 − 2.38* − 2.31*
Exit survey in 1992 − 2.43* − 2.35*
Exit survey in 1993 − 2.32* − 2.32*
Exit survey in 1994 − 2.49* − 2.52*
Exit survey in 1995 − 2.41* − 2.39*
Exit survey in 1996 − 2.23* − 2.23*
Exit survey in 1997 − 1.17* − 1.17*
Exit survey in 1998 − 0.79* − 0.80*
Exit survey in 1999 − 0.47* − 0.48*
Other statistics
ρ 0.63 1.96 0.60 1.30
σ − 0.26 − 0.19 − 0.28 − 0.22
Log likelihood − 2766 − 2458 − 2706 − 2212
r 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Explanatory note: The selectivity indicators take value 1 if one drops out of the survey in a given year. The discount is set to 0.1. We take
the log of consumption and participation. We exclude "Years of labour market with low unemployment", "Elementary education", "Private
sector employee". Asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at conventional level.
Source: SEP, TBO, CERRA: own computations.
4.1 Simulation
In this paragraph, we simulate the effect of the elimination and doubling of two tax credits on the
hazard rate out of work(which is deﬁned as 1−Pr(yt = 1|yt−1 = 1)). Since tax credits have an
impact on lifetime income for those who work relative to the non-employed, the value of our
consumption variable will also be affected. Because the elimination of the tax credits reduces
lifetime income, this will lead to an increase in the hazard rate out of work. Furthermore,
28because the consumption variable in the full consumption model includes the value of home
production and in the standard model it does not, we expect different effects for the different
models. For a robustness check, we will estimate it for different levels of the discount rate. We
use the estimates of model 2 of the previous section as it produces the most plausible results.
Lastly, because we are interested in the possible asymmetry of the response, we simulate both a
reduction and an increase in the tax credits of the same amount.
Figure 4.1 Simulated effect of earned income tax credit policy on the hazard rate out of work.


















































































double EITC full consumption elimination EITC full consumption 
double EITC standard model elimination EITC standard model
Standard 
model 
Source CERRA, SEP, TBO: own computations.
The results for the elimination and doubling of the EITC are shown in ﬁgure 4.1. In the standard
model (line with icons and right axis) eliminating the EITC has a small effect (0,2% points) on
the hazard rate out of work, whereas in the full consumption model (left axis) the effect is
around 4% points. Doubling of the EITC leads to somewhat smaller results and the negative
effect in the standard model is even negligible (0,04%). In the full consumption model the
negative effect on the hazard rate is around 3,5% points. For discounts larger than 30% the
results do not seem to vary any longer. In ﬁgure 4.2, we show the results for the TCEP. Its
elimination increases the hazard rate in the full consumption model by 0,75% points. If we
compare the effects by increasing the effect of TCEP by almost a factor 6, which is the ratio of
the maximum value of the TCEP (214 euro) in comparison with the EITC (1213 euro), then the
effects of the TCEP and the EITC are similar. This is not surprising as most working women in
the sample already have a child and therefore receive the TCEP. Doubling the TCEP also
produces similar negative results, which are of a smaller magnitude then eliminating the TCEP.
There seems to be low dependence on the discount rate.
29Figure 4.2 Simulated effect of tax credit for employed parents policy on the hazard rate out of work.














































































double TCEP full consumption elimination TCEP full consumption
double TCEP standard model elimination TCEP standard model
Standard 
model 
Source CERRA, SEP, TBO: own computations.
A few results are worth mentioning. First of all, the small effect in the standard model is
implausible because the tax credits amounts to about 5% of a woman’s yearly income. The
elimination of these tax credits are likely to produce some effect. Furthermore, the large
difference in the performance of the two models show the impact of including the value of home
production in the consumption variable. The inclusion of home production in the
consumption/income proﬁle reduces the difference between lifetime income for employed and
non- employed (see ﬁgure D.1 in appendix D). A further reduction of this difference by
eliminating the EITC has in this model a relatively larger effect. This results in a lower value of
the ﬁnancial incentive to work and a higher increase in the hazard rate out of work in the full
consumption model relative to the standard model.
Lastly, the difference in the magnitude of the responses to a reduction versus an increase in
the tax credits shows that the effect is non linear. This may reveal a relative preference for
homework (e.g. childcare) for these women who already have a job and do not react linearly to
extra income as an incentive to more work. Stated differently, we may be facing women with
non linear utility functions who have decreasing marginal utility of (full) consumption.
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3334Appendix A The tax credits
According to the Dutch tax law each (self) employed individual is allowed to receive some tax
credits (hefﬁngskortingen in Dutch). After income-taxes are levied, the tax credits are deducted.
The two credits analyzed in this study are the EITC and the TCEP. Their amount is based on
taxable income. In year 2004 individuals with incomes below 8101 euro (minimum wage), could
at most expect an EITC of 142 euro (or 1,753% of their income). The EITC is approximately
11% for higher incomes up to a maximum of 1213 euro. In a household with multiple income
receivers, each receiver is entitled to this tax credit. TCEP eligibility is stricter since it combines
two states: employment and parenthood. It can also be enjoyed by both employed (cohabiting)
adults. The child should be below 12. In 2003 the TCEP amounted to 214 euro for incomes
larger than 4206 euro.
The correct way to implement these tax credits in our computations requires determining
taxable income. One of the main difﬁculties connected to this computation is the tax-deduction
of house-mortgage-payments. The income thresholds to get the maximum credits are very low,
and almost all employees tend to receive the full amount. We have therefore simpliﬁed the tax
system by proportionally reducing the maximum amount to those below the minimum wage.
3536Appendix B Early retirement and birth event probability
distribution
The age of eligibility to early retirement is imputed using the CERRA data. The imputation
procedure is a standard out of sample procedure. Figure B.1 shows the well known peaks at ages
60 and 61 present in other studies (Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004)).















Explanatory note: these are frequencies for male respondents only. Females are treated separately. Frequencies are
derived from the CERRA data and probabilities are imputed in the SEP.
Source: CERRA and SEP, own computations.
For young women without children, we impute the probability distribution of a birth event at any
future age. We exploit information about age of delivery within the whole sample. We also
observe some common characteristics that will be used to ’transfer’ the predicted probabilities to
our sub sample of younger women13.
In ﬁgure B.2, we compare the frequencies of birth event according to age for older women
(not in phase 1), with the out of sample predictions derived by the model for the younger women
13 By use of a logit model, we can compute the probability that a woman experiences a birth event or not. After we can
also compute an ordered logit model to impute the probability that the event occurs at any future (and realistic) age. We
estimate probabilities at ages between 20 and 40 (or 43 if women are in phase 2). With these two sets of probabilities, we
can compute the probability of birth for each age conditional on the occurrence of a birth event, in this way we also
account for the probability that no birth event occurs. Some women enter the sample after age 20. For them the estimated
birth probabilities between age 20 and the age of entrance in the sample are not relevant. The birth probabilities for the
remaining ages are therefore recomputed conditioning on the probabilities cumulated before the age of entrance in the
survey and of course the probability of not giving birth.
37without children (therefore in phase 1).
The model corrects for cohort effects, age and education. It also includes current
labour-market status as a determinant of fertility, in accordance with the suggestions of Bloemen
and Kalwij (2001). A similar procedure, with qualitatively similar results is carried out to impute
the probability of a second birth event for women who already have a child.
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Age
frequency of first birth imputed probability of first birth
Explanatory note: Frequencies are derived from a sample of older women that is made up by 21854 observations. The
imputation is carried out on all women in phase 1. The event of no birth occurs in 28% of the sample of older women.
Birth is imputed on base of the ’presence’ of children in the household. Therefore the real share of ’no births’ should be
lower. The model predicts an average probability of ’no birth’ equal to 11%.
Source: SEP, own computations.
Notice that these results are consistent with data administrated by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
The share of women who do not give birth is about 15% (Source: OG ’98, CBS). The average
estimated probability for the same event in our model is 11%. In addition 7% of the women aged
35-39 in the OG data reports that they have no kids and are willing to have one. This
corresponds almost perfectly with our estimated probability in that age group.
38Appendix C Re-entrances into the labour market
We do not observe re-entrances in our main panel, but we do observe some if we use the broader
time series of cross sections. In both cases there are much less re-entrances than common sense
and anecdotic evidence would suggest (Ooms and Van Gameren (2005)). When we describe the
results of our model we speculate that this may be due to a vicious selection mechanism due to
the sampling procedure. To gain a more general understanding of this phenomenon we look
therefore in the broader cross section. We observe about 20000 households with children. Their
mothers own to different cohorts and their median year of birth is 1955.
Figure C.1 shows their participation over the age of the ﬁrst or youngest child without
distinction for the mothers’ cohort or previous labour market status. It shows that when the ﬁrst
child enters primary school, participation increases again. If we follow the ﬁrst child, we see that
the participation of his mum rises from 21% when he is 4 to approximately 36% when he is 16.
Further it declines steadily again in the next 10 years, to return to the levels of ﬁrst-child’s pre
school age.
In order to impute re-entrances, we need a panel element, in the sense that we need to
observe non employed women in t −1 returning to work in t. As discussed above the amount of
re-entrances in the main panel is about 3% of the sample. This is too few to allow a reliable
estimation of the re-entrances, and we therefore decided to estimate a hazard model only for
labour exits. It is not troublesome to take re-entrances into account in the estimation of the future
expected income proﬁles.
From the time series of cross section, we select a sample of about 15000 women non
employed in t −1 (most of them discarded when selecting out “housewives”) and that may
return to employment in t. This happens for about 6% of the selected sample. This unbalanced
sample (with at least two repeated observations of labour-market status) has therefore twice as
many re-entrances than the main panel (but still very few). On this sample, we estimate a logit
model for re-entrances and in ﬁgure C.2, we summarise the results of the imputation procedure.
The probability of re-entering the labour market varies according to whether women already
have children (phase 2) or not (phase 1). It increases until middle age to decline again in the
proximity of early retirement age.



































youngest child first child
Explanatory note: when the ﬁrst child enters primary school, participation increases again.
Source: SEP, own computations.





































phase 1 phase 2 phases 1 and 2
Source: SEP, own computations.
40Appendix D Incentives
In ﬁgure D.1, we report the average (full) income proﬁles for employed and non employed
women. The area in between the two lines identiﬁes the residual life-cycle incentive to work,
versus stopping with work. It shows that the relative difference between employment and non
employment is smaller with full consumption. This means that when we consider the value of
home production (mostly child care) the incentive to work is relatively smaller.























employed full income non-employed full income
employed market income non-employed market income
Source: SEP, own computations.
4142Appendix E Home production
The activities that we include in the deﬁnition of home production are listed in table E.1. In
order to impute the amount of hours dedicated to home production in the SEP, we have estimated
a OLS regression (see table E.2) on a set of characteristics that are available in the SEP also.
Using the estimated coefﬁcients and the observed variables in the SEP, we can to impute home
production. A similar approach is also used for the imputation of the age of eligibility to early
retirement. See Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004) for details.
Figure E.1 summarises the results that we obtained in the SEP and the observed data in the
TBO. It reports on the horizontal axis the amount of years on which women form expectations
concerning the future proﬁles of time spent at home production. The weekly hours that women
will spend house working is reported on the vertical axis. The ﬁgure is therefore not constructed
on the base of current observations, but on the base of some imputed future characteristics of
each woman for all years subsequent to the current year (see table E.2). Some of these
characteristics, such has her age or the age of her partner, evolve deterministically, while others,
as the amount of her labour-market hours, the amount of labour-market hours of her partner and
the presence of children in a given age group, evolve according to a probabilistic model14. The
ﬁgure also includes the observed TBO patterns according to the age of the child. Note that a
woman in the SEP, currently with no children, in two years time has a small probability of
having a child of age 2. Therefore while in the observed data, moving on in the future children
age deterministically, in the SEP they age ’probabilistically’, which means in a ’slower’ way,
since each year the probability of giving birth is smaller than 1. It is no surprise therefore that for
employed and non employed women the imputed values in the SEP are lower than the observed
data in the TBO. This is normal since the presence of children, that is the most important
determinant of time spent in home production, enters the model probabilistically and each
woman has a probability of not giving birth. On the contrary in the TBO children are observed
with certainty. This means that no woman in the SEP will expect to spend the full amount of
hours of home production that one child needs. As the aim of the imputation in the SEP is only
to determine the expected pattern of hours spend in home production by women in the future, we
interpret these results as very plausible. Also the reduction in working hours seems plausible, if
we consider that in zero women may have any age between 20 and 43. Also the little hump
shape after 13 years is realistic, since at that time women are very likely to have a child of
schooling age who therefore needs less care.
14 The model includes the probability of giving birth in the future, of re-entering the labour market if non employed and the
probability to early retire at each future age if employed, and also the survival probabilities.
43Table E.1 TBO variables, activities included in the deﬁnition of home production
Cooking Playing at home with children
Set table Walk outside with children
Wash (kitchen) Medical care of children
Vacuum cleaning Look after children
Cleaning windows and doors Care use for children
Sweeping the ﬂoor Car reparations for children
Furniture cleanings Scooter use for children
Setting the bed Bike use for children
Outside housework Walking for children
Carwash Purchasing food in stores
Maintain bike Purchasing food in shops
Laundry Pick up meals
Ironing Visit the market
Cloths reparations Visit a shopping centre
Gardening Visit a cloths shop
Other reparations of the house Visit a ironware shop
Care of pats Visit the doctor
Care of plants Visit other shops
Organizing Visit post ofﬁce
Car use for housework Visit bank
Car reparations for housework Visit council
Scooter use for housework Visit automatic laundry
Bike use for housework Waiting
Walks for housework Car use for shopping
Care of babies Car reparations for shopping
Care of children Scooter use for shopping
Helping in housework Biking for shopping
Reading out for children Walking for shopping
Source: TBO.
44Figure E.1 Time use for future years in the SEP and time spent home production in the TBO data according to
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Source: SEP and TBO, own computations.
Table E.2 Model for home production
Estimate T-val
Age woman 0.18 2.62
Age man-age woman 0.12 1.32
Child younger than 3 17.87 18.02
Child between 4 and 11 10.85 10.69
Child between 12 and 18 3.12 1.96
Woman intermediate education − 0.90 − 1.17
Woman higher education − 0.95 − 0.97
Woman hours in the labor market − 0.52 − 18.24
Men hours in the labor market 0.09 3.11
Constant term 25.88 9.23
Explanatory note: OLS coefﬁcients in the estimates. Reference case for children’s age: women with no children.
Source: TBO.
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